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GONZALES V. CARHART AND THE HAZARDS
OF MUDDLED SCRUTINY
David D. Meyer*
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,1
upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, has
incited both passion and puzzlement. The passions are readily
understandable. The case was, after all, the new Roberts Court‘s
first pass at what is commonly taken to be ―the most divisive issue
in America.‖2 And the Court‘s five-to-four decision only
magnified the drama by producing several additional ―firsts.‖ The
Washington Post, for example, observed that, ―[f]or the first time
since the court established a woman‘s right to an abortion in 1973,
the justices said the Constitution permits a nationwide prohibition
on a specific abortion method.‖3 Justice Ginsburg, in a blistering
dissent which she read aloud from the bench, emphasized that ―for
the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no
exception safeguarding a woman‘s health.‖ 4
Advocates on both sides of the abortion question saw the
decision as a turning point.5 Opponents of abortion hailed the
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I am grateful to
Mike Cahill, Marsha Garrison, Nan Hunter, Karen Porter, and the other
participants at Brooklyn Law School‘s March 2008 symposium, The “PartialBirth Abortion” Ban: Health Care in the Shadow of Criminal Liability, as well
as to the editors of the Journal of Law and Policy.
1
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
2
JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 74
(Penguin Group 2007).
3
Mark Sherman, Justices Uphold Abortion Procedure Ban, WASH. POST,
Apr. 19, 2007.
4
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of
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decision as ―the most monumental win on the abortion issue that
we have ever had.‖6 Many supporters of abortion rights saw the
decision as equally momentous. The Court‘s willingness to uphold
the federal ban on ―partial birth‖ abortions, having effectively
wiped thirty similar state laws off the books just seven years earlier
in Stenberg v. Carhart,7 was certainly striking. Leroy Carhart, the
Nebraska physician who had now twice given his name to
Supreme Court landmarks, warned that the decision appeared to
―open[] the door to an all-out assault‖ on Roe.8 The four dissenters
agreed, lamenting that ―[t]he Court‘s hostility to the [abortion]
right . . . is not concealed.‖9
The initial assessments may have exaggerated Carhart‘s
immediate impact on abortion; because the method of abortion
proscribed by the federal Act was exceedingly rare to begin with,
the practical consequences for doctors and patients have been
limited.10 Yet, quite apart from Carhart‘s implications for Roe, the
decision has provoked puzzlement over what it might mean for the
future of constitutional privacy and substantive due process more
generally. Carhart was not only the Roberts Court‘s first abortion
case, after all, but also its first significant encounter with
unenumerated rights under substantive due process—including
what John Roberts, before his nomination, had called ―the socalled ‗right to privacy.‘‖ 11 As much as the Court‘s about-face
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 519, 567 (2007)
(observing that ―[m]ost commentators agreed that Gonzales took a large step in
the direction of eventually overturning Roe‖).
6
Sherman, supra note 3 (quoting Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of American
Center for Law and Justice).
7
530 U.S. 914 (2003) (striking down Nebraska statute banning ―partial
birth abortion[s]‖); see id. at 977, 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court‘s judgment effectively invalidated similar laws in thirty states).
8
Sherman, supra note 3 (quoting Dr. Leroy Carhart).
9
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10
David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future
of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 45 (concluding that ―Gonzales v.
Carhart has changed the law, politics, and medicine of abortion far less than
most early observers hastily thought‖); see also Pushaw, supra note 5, at 567–72
(emphasizing narrowness of Carhart‘s holding).
11
Adam Liptak, Privacy Views: Roberts Argued Hard for Others, N.Y.
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from Stenberg, some observers focused on the jarring difference in
tone and outcome from the Court‘s 2003 decision in Lawrence v.
Texas.12
Lawrence had seemed to signal a newly expansive approach to
substantive due process in the course of striking down a criminal
prohibition against same-sex intimacy. Justice Kennedy‘s rhetoric
for the Court had soared in denouncing the government‘s
encroachment on the ―‗personal dignity and autonomy‘‖ of gays
and lesbians.13 Four years later in Carhart, human dignity again
featured in Justice Kennedy‘s analysis but this time as a
justification for state intervention limiting personal choice. ―The
Act,‖ Kennedy wrote for the Court in sustaining the federal law,
―expresses respect for the dignity of human life.‖14 The dignity
interests of women confronted with an unwanted pregnancy went
largely unacknowledged; instead, as family law scholars Joanna
Grossman and Linda McClain observed, ―[a]bortions seem[ed]
only, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, to involve the ‗abortion
doctor,‘ ‗the fetus,‘ and ‗the cervix.‘‖ 15
The juxtaposition of Kennedy‘s opinions in Lawrence and
Carhart left some Court-watchers scratching their heads. Linda
Greenhouse, the New York Times‘ veteran Supreme Court reporter,
found it ―hard to reconcile [Kennedy‘s] capacious understanding of
the human condition in [Lawrence] . . . with the patronizing and
counter-factual attitude toward women that suffuses his majority
opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart.‖16 Rich Lowry, editor of the
National Review, was even more blunt. He accused Kennedy, the

TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A1.
12
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13
Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
14
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
15
Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, Gonzales v. Carhart: How the
Supreme Court’s Validation of the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
Affects Women’s Constitutional Liberty and Equality, FINDLAW, May 7, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070507_mcclain.html (last visited
July 31, 2008).
16
Talk to the Newsroom: Supreme Court Reporter, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/07/business/media/14askthetimes.html.
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new pivot man on the Roberts Court, of ―making it up as he goes
along.‖17
Still others have seen in Carhart not meandering, but a
deliberate and fateful jurisprudential turn. Professor Steven
Calabresi reads Carhart to mark a pointed retreat from Lawrence.
―Justice Kennedy‘s narrow, restrained approach to substantive due
process in Gonzales v. Carhart, the blockbuster partial birth
abortion case decided this past term,‖ he writes, ―shows that he and
four other Justices have recommitted themselves to the narrow,
restrained approach of Glucksberg in substantive due process
cases.‖18 After Carhart, Calabresi concludes, ―Lawrence is void
for vagueness.‖19
This Article considers Carhart‘s implications for future
constitutional protection of unenumerated rights under the
Constitution. There is no doubting that Kennedy‘s opinion in
Carhart sounds a very different theme from his work in Lawrence.
In fact, as I explain more fully below, in some ways it might well
be fair to describe Carhart as a sort of ―Anti-Lawrence.‖ Yet, for
all the differences in tone and focus, it appears that Carhart
ultimately does not so much reject Lawrence as highlight an
implicit weakness in its approach to protecting privacy rights.
Carhart, after all, ultimately upholds the ban on ―partial-birth
abortions‖ not by denying that abortion is a constitutional right, but
by finding the state‘s imposition on that right to be reasonable.
Lawrence had left the door open to just such limitations when it
carefully carved out the question of marriage and other state laws
conferring ―formal recognition‖ on same-sex families. 20 In this
sense, Carhart may provide a road map for further restrictions of
constitutional liberties relating to family and intimate association
17

Rich Lowry, America’s Worst Justice, NAT‘L REVIEW ONLINE, July 1,
2008, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q= NDZhYmJkOWU1OWNiNTRlND
VmYTVhMGViYzUxYzczY2M=.
18
Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2008) (referring to Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
19
Id.
20
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); id. at 585 (O‘Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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that might be found to be consistent with Lawrence. Instead of
centering the fight on a threshold characterization of the liberty
interest at stake as fundamental, Carhart shifts the weight of
analysis to an outright balancing of state and private interests,
ultimately guided by crucial facts supplied by the legislature. By
this account, Lawrence and Carhart together suggest that future
battles over the scope of constitutional protection for individual
and family privacy will focus less on the boundaries of history and
tradition, as Professor Calabresi supposes, and more on disputed
questions of contemporary fact.
Part I of this Article sets the stage for Carhart by describing
earlier developments in the Supreme Court‘s approaches to
abortion and other family privacy rights. In 1992, the Court had
differentiated abortion from other fundamental rights and assigned
it a more qualified form of protection under the ―undue burden‖
test. Yet subsequent decisions in 2000—including one that
emerged from the Court‘s first meeting with Dr. Carhart—seemed
to bring both lines of doctrine back toward common ground. Part II
contends that Lawrence v. Texas appeared to confirm the new
approach, defining the boundaries of substantive due process
loosely in order to extend privacy protection more broadly, while
providing the protected interests with a muddled form of
intermediate scrutiny.
In Part III, I turn to the Court‘s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart,
acknowledging the ways in which Carhart might accurately be
described as Lawrence‘s ―polar opposite.‖21 Indeed, the contrasts
between the decisions are strong enough that it is tempting to
conclude that one of them must be an outlier. Yet, in Part IV, I
suggest that both ultimately share a common inclination to resolve
substantive due process disputes based on a relatively fluid
balancing of competing private and public interests, while avoiding
more categorical doctrinal solutions. In addition, Carhart‘s
readiness to defer to legislative fact-finding in striking that balance
suggests that the focus of future court battles over same-sex
marriage, adoption, and similar controversies is likely to be less on
the bounds of ―deeply rooted‖ tradition and history and more on
21

Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1521.
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contemporary empirical claims about child welfare and family
policy.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF MUDDLED SCRUTINY IN ABORTION AND
FAMILY PRIVACY
By conventional understanding, fundamental rights under the
Constitution are given maximum protection by the courts through
the framework of strict scrutiny. This means that any substantial
government burden on such a right is presumed to be
unconstitutional, salvageable only if the state can prove that the
burden is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling public interest.
The right of marital privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut
had been described as fundamental in this sense, 22 as had the right
to abortion in Roe v. Wade.23 And so strict scrutiny was commonly
said to govern restrictions on abortion as well as on marriage,
contraception, childrearing, and the other family-related privacy
rights recognized by the Supreme Court.24
In reality, close observation revealed that the Court‘s review
often strayed from this formal description. By the late 1980s, for
example, it was clear that the Court had relaxed its scrutiny of
abortion regulations. Rather than rigidly insisting upon
―compelling interests‖ and ―narrow tailoring,‖ the Court essentially
passed upon the ―reasonableness‖ of individual regulations from
case to case.25 Something similar could be seen in the Court‘s
cases dealing with other family-related liberties. Even when the
Court squarely found burdens on fundamental rights to marry or to
share a home with one‘s extended family, for example, the Justices
sometimes muddied the waters in describing their scrutiny of the
proffered state interests.26 Nevertheless, constitutional protection
22

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
24
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.3 689 (7th ed. 2000).
25
See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate:
Judicial Experience with the 1980’s “Reasonableness” Test, 76 VA. L. REV.
519, 523 (1990).
26
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 689–90 (describing the
23
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for abortion and for other family privacy rights was treated alike
and at least nominally described as maximal.
In 1992, however, this ―Black Letter‖ law was substantially
rewritten. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Court narrowly turned back a frontal attack on the right
to abortion, and to the surprise of many reaffirmed Roe‘s ―central
holding.‖27 In doing so, however, the authors of Casey‘s joint
opinion, at least two of whom had long expressed skepticism about
Roe‘s validity, 28 resolved their misgivings by giving the abortion
right a specially qualified status. A woman‘s profoundly personal
interest in making decisions concerning her pregnancy, Casey
acknowledged, is of the same character as other fundamental
―personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
Justices‘ descriptions of scrutiny of the proffered state interests); see also David
D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 537–48
(2000) (surveying case law and concluding that ―the Court‘s family-privacy
cases leave considerable doubt about whether strict scrutiny is in fact the
governing constitutional test‖); Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in
Fourteenth Amendment “Privacy” Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization
of Social Issues, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1988) (observing that in its
constitutional privacy cases ―the Court often seems to be using standards
somewhere between the classic rational-basis and compelling-state-interest
standards‖).
27
505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); see also Talk to the Newsroom, supra note 16
(New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse recently called Casey ―[t]he most
surprising decision‖ during her nearly thirty years covering the Supreme Court.).
28
In 1989, for example, Justice Kennedy joined Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s
opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989),
describing Roe in these unflattering terms:
[T]he rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a
Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in
general principles, as ours does. The key elements of the Roe
framework--trimesters and viability--are not found in the text of the
Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a
constitutional principle.
Id. at 518. Justice O‘Connor, too, repeatedly observed that ―Roe‘s trimester
framework . . . [is] problematic.‖ Id. at 529 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that ―[t]he State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal
health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist
‗throughout pregnancy‘‖); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting in part).
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contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education‖—decisions the Court has held belong to a ―‗private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.‘‖29 And, yet,
―[a]bortion is a unique act,‖ Casey explained.30 Its exercise is
―fraught with consequences for others,‖ including family members,
the would-be father, and ―the life or potential life that is aborted.‖31
The need to balance these weighty interests was said to warrant
more leeway for state regulation in the context of abortion, and
therefore a new and softer standard of review. Accordingly, Casey
jettisoned Roe‘s strict-scrutiny test, with its ―rigid trimester
framework,‖ in favor of the more flexible ―undue burden‖
standard.32 Under the new test, government may regulate access to
abortion before viability, so long as ―its purpose or effect is [not]
to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion.‖33 After viability, government may go so far as
prohibiting abortion altogether, ―‗except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.‘‖34
Of course, some doubted that Casey‘s ratcheting down of the
strict scrutiny standard normally used to protect fundamental rights
was driven strictly by the ―uniqueness‖ of abortion. It was also
eminently plausible to understand the ―undue burden‖ standard as
a practical compromise of the Court‘s ongoing doubts about
whether abortion truly qualified as a fundamental constitutional
right.35 The Court might reconcile itself to a debatable extension of
privacy‘s boundaries by watering down the strength of protection
afforded.36 In any event, for whatever reason, Casey unmistakably
29

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–53 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
30
Id. at 852.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 878–79.
33
Id. at 878.
34
Id. at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973)).
35
See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 65
(2001); Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1980, 1981–85 (2002).
36
Cf. Schneider, supra note 26, at 87 (noting that ―one obvious solution to

MEYER

4/27/2009 7:12 PM

THE HAZARDS OF MUDDLED SCRUTINY

65

drove a wedge in privacy doctrine, separating constitutional
protection of abortion from the nominally full-strength protection
accorded other fundamental family-related rights.37
Eight years after Casey, however, there was ground for
reconsidering abortion‘s constitutional ―uniqueness.‖ In 2000, the
Supreme Court decided two cases just three weeks apart that
suggested a closer affinity between abortion and other family
privacy rights. One was Stenberg v. Carhart, 38 the first ―partial
birth abortion‖ case. The other was Troxel v. Granville,39 dealing
with the fundamental child-rearing rights of parents. On one hand,
Stenberg was notable for the strength of the protection it gave to
the abortion right, suggesting that Casey‘s undue-burden
framework was not as weak as some had supposed. On the other
hand, Troxel suggested that constitutional protection for parental
rights is not so strong as commonly believed.
Stenberg presented a challenge to a Nebraska law that
prohibited ―partial birth abortion.‖ The Nebraska statute defined
the proscribed act as ―deliberately and intentionally delivering into
the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof,
for the purpose of performing a procedure [intended to] . . . kill the
unborn child . . . .‖40 The Act made an exception for such abortions
when ―necessary to save the life of the mother,‖ but not for those
necessary to preserve a woman‘s health. 41
A five-member majority struck down the Nebraska statute on
two independent grounds. First, the statute‘s definition of ―partial
birth abortion‖ was found to be so broad that it could encompass

the problem of a too-expansive privacy doctrine is to allow the state interests in
. . . regulation[] to override the privacy right‖).
37
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 681 (2004) (stating that
Casey ―altered the very nature of the abortion right, demoting it from a
fundamental right to something more enigmatic and certainly more fragile‖).
38
530 U.S. 914 (2000). In this Article, to avoid confusion I refer to
Stenberg v. Carhart as ―Stenberg,‖ and Gonzales v. Carhart as ―Carhart.‖
39
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
40
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921–22 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28328(1), 28-326(9) (Supp. 1999)).
41
Id. at 921 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (2007)).
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not only ―dilation and extraction‖ (D&X) abortions—the method
that was said to be the target of the law—but also ―dilation and
evacuation‖ (D&E) abortions, a far more commonly used method.
Since the law effectively foreclosed the most common method of
second-trimester abortion, it constituted an ―undue burden‖ on a
woman‘s right to choose abortion.42
Second, the statute‘s failure to make an exception for abortions
necessary to safeguard a woman‘s health was held also sufficient
to overturn it.43 Nebraska defended the law on the ground that a
woman‘s safety would never require access to the proscribed
method of abortion, but the Court was unpersuaded. 44 Justice
Breyer‘s majority opinion acknowledged that it was uncertain
whether loss of the D&X method would actually endanger women,
but held that the medical uncertainty favored leaving women with
more options. ―[T]he division of medical opinion about the matter
at most means uncertainty,‖ Breyer wrote, ―a factor that signals the
presence of risk, not its absence.‖45
Stenberg‘s invalidation of Nebraska‘s law was, to many
commentators, surprisingly strong.46 The Court did not move
cautiously, deciding the case on the narrowest possible ground and
stopping there. Instead, having found the law unconstitutional on
one ground, the Court proceeded to explore and resolve a second
potential defect.47 Moreover, the Court analyzed the lack of a
health exception outside the framework of Casey‘s ―undue burden‖
test. A health exception was required, the Court held, because the
record made it plausible to believe that for some women the
prohibited D&X method would be the safest choice. 48 This was a
shift from Casey itself, which, as Caitlin Borgmann has noted,
42

See id. at 938–45.
Id. at 937–38.
44
Id. at 937.
45
Id.
46
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term – Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 110–13 (2000); David D.
Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1125, 1155–63 (2001); Pushaw, supra note 5, at 556–59.
47
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938.
48
Id. at 936–37.
43
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seemed to ―subsume the medical emergency exception within the
undue burden test rather than treating it as a separate, categorical
requirement‖ and which ―did not foreclose the possibility that the
Court would tolerate some unspecified level of risk to a woman‘s
health.‖49 In Stenberg, the Court felt no need to quantify the
precise magnitude of the medical risk posed by alternative
procedures or to weigh that risk against the strength of the state‘s
interests in proscribing the method.50 Instead, the Court‘s opinion
could be read to suggest that imposition of any health risk on
women by the state was per se unconstitutional.
It was this aspect of the Court‘s holding that most provoked
Justice Kennedy in dissent. Requiring a health exception without
determining whether the medical risks were significant enough to
constitute an ―undue burden,‖ he argued, utterly ignored the
bargain struck in Casey by elevating the woman‘s interests
categorically above those of the state and others. 51 The whole point
of Casey, Kennedy insisted, was that abortion regulations would be
evaluated by a more fluid balancing of the private and state
interests at stake; by strictly privileging the woman‘s health
interests without any balancing, Stenberg had failed ―to accord any
weight to Nebraska‘s interest in prohibiting partial birth
abortion.‖52 ―This is an immense constitutional holding,‖ Kennedy
fumed, and betrayed Casey‘s promise to be ―more solicitous of
state attempts to vindicate interests related to abortion.‖ 53 Justice
Thomas, joined by the remaining dissenters, agreed that the
Court‘s analysis ―portends a return to an era [of aggressive
scrutiny] I had thought we had at last abandoned.‖54

49

Borgmann, supra note 37, at 696, 700.
Compare Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914, with Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d
857, 885 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the
lack of a health exception in Wisconsin‘s and Illinois‘s ―partial birth abortion‖
law were unconstitutional because they posed an ―undue burden‖ to women
seeking late-term abortions), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
51
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 978–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
54
Id. at 983 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50
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The rhetoric of the Stenberg dissents may have been excessive,
but there was little doubt that the majority in Stenberg had indeed
secured and bolstered constitutional protection for abortion. ―The
lesson from Stenberg v. Carhart,‖ wrote Professor George Annas
shortly after the decision was handed down, ―is that the right to
choose to have an abortion is in no danger from the Court.‖55 The
―undue burden‖ test was not strict scrutiny, but it wasn‘t a pushover either; in fact, when it came to the health of women, it did not
even apply. 56
The Court‘s decision in Stenberg came just a few weeks after
its decision in Troxel v. Granville. Whereas Stenberg involved the
most contentious ground of constitutional privacy, Troxel involved
―perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court,‖ and certainly the least controversial: the ―interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.‖ 57 In
Troxel, the Court ruled in favor of the parent, holding that courtordered visitation for grandparents over a mother‘s objection
violated her fundamental rights as a parent. But it did so on
surprisingly narrow grounds and without applying strict scrutiny.
Troxel arose from a trial court‘s decision to order regular
visitation for the paternal grandparents of two girls whose father
had committed suicide. 58 The trial court judge acted under a
Washington statute that authorized courts to order visitation for
―any person‖ at ―any time‖ a judge thought it beneficial to a
child.59 The Washington Supreme Court held the statute to be
facially unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, reasoning that the
state could not impose on a parent‘s judgment concerning
visitation unless necessary to advance a compelling state interest.60
55

George J. Annas, The Shadowlands: The Regulation of Human
Reproduction in the United States, in CROSS-CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND
POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND 143, 150 (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar &
Mavis Maclean eds., 2000).
56
See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930–38.
57
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (O‘Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
58
Id. at 60–61.
59
Id. at 60 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1999)).
60
See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27–31 (Wash. 1998), aff’d sub
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While safeguarding a child from serious harm could qualify as a
compelling interest, the state court held, merely advancing a
child‘s ―best interests‖ could not.61 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a split in the state courts over the
constitutionality of grandparent visitation laws, and taking up the
question in the context of Washington‘s notably free-wheeling
statute suggested the possibility of a relatively easy resolution.
But the case turned out to be anything but easy. In the end, the
Court splintered six ways. There was broad agreement among the
Justices that court-ordered visitation substantially burdened the
mother‘s fundamental child-rearing right, but much less consensus
about what to do about it. Justice O‘Connor‘s plurality opinion
readily agreed that Washington‘s statute was ―breathtakingly
broad,‖ and yet was unwilling to follow the Washington Supreme
Court in holding it facially invalid.62 Instead, the plurality was
prepared to say only that the statute had been unconstitutionally
applied on the facts of the case. Moreover, in explaining that result,
the plurality did not use the usual language of ―compelling
interests‖ and ―narrow tailoring,‖ but held only that the
Constitution required the state to give ―special weight‖ to a
parent‘s concerns before overriding her judgments about
visitation. 63 The separate opinions of Justices Souter, Stevens, and
Kennedy, variously concurring and dissenting in the result, applied
similarly opaque standards.64 Indeed, only Justice Thomas, writing
separately and joined by no other Justice, was left to wonder
plaintively why strict scrutiny was nowhere to be found in the
other opinions. 65

nom. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
61
Smith, 969 P.2d at 30.
62
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (O‘Connor, J., plurality opinion).
63
See id. at 69–70.
64
See id. at 75–77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 85–91 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 94–101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65
Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (―The opinions of the plurality, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a [fundamental parenting] right, but
curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would
apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.‖).
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Yet, the answer was clear enough. Both the plurality and
Justices Stevens and Kennedy in dissent cautioned that rigid
enforcement of parental prerogative carried the risk of
extinguishing other family relationships of enormous significance.
This was especially true in light of the growing diversity of
modern family life.66 ―[P]ersons outside the nuclear family,‖ the
plurality noted, ―are called upon with increasing frequency to assist
in the everyday tasks of child rearing.‖67 Justice Kennedy worried
that ―[c]ases are sure to arise – perhaps a substantial number of
cases – in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child
which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto.‖68
Justice Stevens likewise emphasized that children sometimes
establish ―family-like bonds‖ with non-parents.69
The Court in Troxel was not ready to describe these other
family interests as full-blown fundamental rights, though Justices
Stevens and Scalia each hinted at that possibility. 70 But it did not
need to. It was plain enough that a majority on the Court favored a
softer, more flexible constitutional standard that would leave room
for reasonable accommodation of the competing family interests.

66

Id. at 63 (plurality opinion) (observing that ―[t]he demographic changes
of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family‖).
67
Id. at 64.
68
Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70
See id. (―While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the
nature of a child‘s liberty interests in preserving established familial or familylike bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their
interests be balanced in the equation.‖); id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(―Judicial vindication of ‗parental rights‘ under a Constitution that does not even
mention them requires (as Justice Kennedy‘s opinion rightly points out) not only
a judicially crafted definition of parents, but also – unless, as no one believes,
the parental rights are to be absolute – judicially approved assessments of ‗harm
to the child‘ and judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents,
extended family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be invalid, longterm guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of the
parents.‖).
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As Justice Stevens put it, in a statement that captured the main
concern emphasized as well by both the plurality and Justice
Kennedy, ―[t]he almost infinite variety of family relationships that
pervade our ever-changing society strongly counsel against the
creation by this Court of a constitutional rule that treats a
biological parent‘s liberty interest in the care and supervision of
her child as an isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily.‖ 71
The evident solution was to sidestep the rigid presumption of
individual entitlement underlying strict scrutiny and substitute a
softer standard that would allow a more fluid balancing of the
competing interests.
Professor Carl Schneider, writing a dozen years before Troxel,
had foreseen that ―one solution to the uncertain dimensions of the
[privacy] rights of nonstandard rights-bearers would be to
acknowledge a state interest . . . in protecting the right-bearers (as
with minors)‖ sufficient to override the privacy rights of traditional
rights-bearers (such as parents).72 At the time, he considered that
approach to be effectively ―barred by the virtually outcomedeterminative nature of the question whether a fundamental right is
at stake‖ under conventional strict-scrutiny analysis. 73 Yet, by
departing from strict scrutiny it was possible to expand the
boundaries of constitutional protection without tying the hands of
government in addressing the inevitable clashes of private interests
that would follow. 74
It seemed then, after Stenberg and Troxel, that constitutional
doctrine protecting abortion and other family privacy rights was
again converging on a common approach.75 In both contexts, the
hard edges of conventional doctrinal categories (e.g., ―fundamental
rights‖) had been deliberately blurred, and the (nominally) brightline directives of tiered scrutiny had been replaced by muddled,
fact-intensive inquiries that sought to balance more flexibly the
competing interests from case-to-case.
71

Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Schneider, supra note 26, at 87.
73
Id.
74
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992).
75
See Meyer, Lochner Redeemed, supra note 46, at 1163.
72
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II. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE ―MANIFOLD POSSIBILITIES‖ OF
LIBERTY
The Supreme Court‘s next major constitutional privacy case,
Lawrence v. Texas,76 followed precisely the tack suggested by
Troxel, extending the boundaries of substantive due process
protection while compensating for that generosity by clouding and
qualifying the strength of the protection afforded. Lawrence drew
on the line of constitutional privacy cases, from Griswold through
Casey, to protect the sexual intimacy of gays and lesbians, striking
down a Texas sodomy law that applied only to same-sex
partners.77 Yet it famously did so without explicitly describing
their liberty interest as ―fundamental‖ and without applying the
strict scrutiny normally associated with fundamental rights.78
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion for the Court compounded the
uncertainty by borrowing from the language of rational-basis
review, concluding, for example, that Texas‘ sodomy law
―further[ed] no legitimate interest which can justify its intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual.‖79
But it was obvious that some stronger form of scrutiny was at
work in Lawrence. First, although the Court did not label the
claimants‘ interest a ―fundamental right‖ or a ―privacy right,‖
Kennedy labored throughout his majority opinion to connect their
interest with those protected in past fundamental privacy decisions.
―[T]he most pertinent beginning point,‖ the Court explained in
launching its analysis, ―is our decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,‖ which first announced the constitutional right of
privacy. 80 From there, Kennedy traced succeeding privacy cases to
show that constitutional protection had pushed beyond narrow
boundaries of marriage and the traditional family. 81 Finally,
Lawrence quoted Casey‘s statement of the basis for the
76

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See id. at 564–75.
78
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
79
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
80
Id. at 564 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
81
See id. at 565–66.
77
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Constitution‘s heightened protection of ―personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education‖—a statement savaged
by Justice Scalia as Casey‘s ―famed sweet-mystery-of-life
passage‖82—and concluded that ―[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as
heterosexual persons do.‖83 This was, in fact, arguably the most
crucial point of departure between Lawrence and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 84 which in 1986 had upheld a Georgia sodomy law
under rational-basis review. In Bowers, the Court could find ―[n]o
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other‖85; in Lawrence, by
contrast, the Court saw that same-sex intimacy shares in the same
essential qualities that define conventional family relationships. 86
Second, Kennedy pointedly wrangled with the privacy analysis
used by the Court in Bowers. In finding no privacy right implicated
by Georgia‘s sodomy law, Bowers had characterized the privacy
interest at stake narrowly as one of ―homosexual sodomy.‖ 87 It
then denied heightened protection for that interest by limiting the
scope of constitutional privacy to liberties that could be said to be
―‗deeply rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition.‘‖88 Lawrence
criticized Bowers on both points.
Bowers‘ narrow description of the private interest, Kennedy
wrote in Lawrence, ―disclose[d] the Court‘s own failure to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.‖89 The Bowers Court
should have looked beyond the ―particular sex act‖ to see that the
Texas sodomy law implicated intimate associational interests

82

Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 574 (majority opinion).
84
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
85
Id. at 191.
86
See David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
453, 454–55 (2004).
87
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91.
88
Id. at 191–92 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
89
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
83

MEYER

74

4/27/2009 7:12 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

essentially like those protected within conventional families. 90 ―To
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim,‖ Kennedy wrote, ―just
as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.‖91 Having taken
Bowers to task over its exceedingly narrow framing of the claimed
fundamental right, the Lawrence opinion went on to criticize
Bowers‘ focus on ―deeply rooted‖ social consensus as the test for
validating the claimed right. Kennedy‘s opinion chided Bowers for
its description of the historical record before then declaring that, in
any event, ―our laws and traditions in the past half century are of
most relevance.‖92 More recent developments, Lawrence
contended, showed ―an emerging awareness‖ that the state has no
business telling consenting adults how to run their sex lives. 93 For
Lawrence, this modern consensus amply validated the
substantiality of the claimed liberty interest.
Given the weight of the private interests at stake, it was not
enough for the state simply to invoke ―respect for the traditional
family‖ or popular morality. 94 ―The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law.‖95 Lawrence
answered no. Justice Kennedy closed the Court‘s opinion with a
ringing affirmation of the importance of flexibility in interpreting
the protection afforded by substantive due process:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to
have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the

90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id.
Id. at 571–72.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 571.
Id.
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Constitution endures, persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.96
To many, Lawrence signaled an important shift in the Court‘s
approach to substantive due process. 97 As Professor Nan Hunter
observed, by ―extending meaningful constitutional protection to
liberty interests without denominating them as fundamental
rights,‖ Lawrence was able to sidestep the usual ―containment
devices‖ on the Court‘s role, including the insistence that nontextual rights be ―deeply rooted‖ in history and tradition. 98 In
substitution, Lawrence offered the prospect of broader, though
more indeterminate, constitutional protection by ―combining the
inquiry into whether the government‘s justification was reasonable
with consideration of the nature and the weight of the individual
interests asserted.‖99
It was precisely this implication that sent Justice Scalia into
such urgent damage-control in dissent. Lawrence, he insisted, did
not redefine substantive due process or recognize a fundamental
right; it was simply an aberration, a run-away rational-basis case
that would ultimately, he hoped, be confined to its facts. 100 By
casting Lawrence in this way, Scalia hoped to limit future use of
the decision as precedent for recognizing other fundamental rights.
To have recognized Lawrence as premised upon constitutional
privacy would have meant acknowledging the double-barreled
damage it did to the doctrinal containment devices Scalia and like-

96

Id. at 578–79.
See Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry:
Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1184, 1187–88 (2004); Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian
Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21 (2003); Matthew
Coles, Lawrence v. Texas and the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16
STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 23, 26 (2005); Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of
Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 64 (2006); Nan D. Hunter, Living
with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2004); Tribe, supra note 78, at
1899–1900.
98
Hunter, supra note 97, at 1104, 1119.
99
Id. at 1122.
100
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97
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minded privacy skeptics had labored hard to construct in past
cases. Of course, designating Lawrence as a rational-basis case
meant that its implications were potentially even broader.101 But
Scalia was likely prepared to gamble that its robust brand of
scrutiny would quickly prove unsustainable if applied generally to
rank-and-file liberty interests.
For the most part, Justice Scalia‘s gamble appears to be paying
off. In the years since Lawrence was decided, most lower federal
and state courts have concluded that ―[d]espite its use of seemingly
sweeping language, the holding in Lawrence is actually quite
narrow.‖102 Decisions have emphasized limiting principles
suggested in Lawrence‘s majority opinion—distinguishing claims
of association involving commercial exchange, public settings, or
minors, for instance—to blunt its application. 103 In particular, most
courts have not read Lawrence as displacing the narrower approach
to substantive due process suggested in Washington v.
Glucksberg. 104 As a panel of the D.C. Circuit observed in 2006,
most federal circuits ―have either treated the Glucksberg analysis
as controlling after Lawrence, or viewed Lawrence as not, properly
speaking, a substantive due process decision.‖ 105 A number of
101

Randy Barnett, for example, reads Lawrence as extending its more
substantive form of scrutiny to all government restrictions of individual liberty,
disregarding distinctions between ―fundamental‖ and ―non-fundamental‖
liberties. See Barnett, supra note 97, at 35–36.
102
State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742 (Utah 2006).
103
See, e.g., United States v. Palfrey, 499 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 2007)
(distinguishing Lawrence in case involving prostitution); State v. Senters, 699
N.W.2d 810, 815–16 (Neb. 2005) (distinguishing Lawrence in case involving
conduct with a 17-year-old minor); State v. Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 516–17
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (distinguishing Lawrence in case involving conduct
between consenting adult family members); Singson v. Commonwealth, 621
S.E.2d 682 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing Lawrence in case involving
public conduct).
104
See, e.g., Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir.
2008); Williams v. Att‘y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235–37 (11th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963,
999–1000 (Wash. 2006); see also Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1527–28; Brian
Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since
Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2006).
105
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
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lower courts have cited Justice Scalia‘s dissent to justify their
conclusion that Lawrence is, at the end of the day, a quirky
rational-basis case that can be safely set aside and ignored.106
That outcome is attractive for judges who are hostile to
Lawrence‘s direction or wary of departing from older precedent
without more explicit marching orders from the Supreme Court.
But it cannot easily be squared with Lawrence itself. A faithful
reading of Justice Kennedy‘s majority opinion makes clear that
Lawrence strayed well beyond rational basis review. After all, if
Lawrence agreed with Bowers that no fundamental right was
presented, and disagreed only about the availability of a rational
basis for the state‘s policy, there would have been no reason for the
extended refutation of Bowers‘ approach to framing and validating
fundamental rights. Similarly, the only way to make sense of the
Lawrence Court‘s strenuous effort to align its own holding with
those of earlier Courts in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Casey is to
understand Lawrence as recognizing a liberty interest of similar
quality.
Scalia himself anticipated that Lawrence, if applied faithfully,
offered a model for scrutinizing tradition and morality in family
law more broadly. 107 And, while Lawrence has not radically
reshaped family law on a broad scale, some courts have notably
drawn on the decision to subject traditional family law measures to
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 476 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted), vacated
on reh’g en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). The Abigail Alliance
panel also asserted flatly that ―[n]o court has regarded Lawrence as cabining
Glucksberg.‖ Id. There is, however, some authority using Lawrence to cabin
Glucksberg. See, e.g., McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 488 (E.D.N.Y.
July 21, 2008) (concluding that Lawrence appears to modify Glucksberg‘s
approach by focusing attention on more recent historical support for a claimed
fundamental right).
106
See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 988 (2005); Lofton v. Sec‘y of Dep‘t of Children & Fam. Servs., 358
F.3d 804, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005); Cook v.
Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394–95 (D. Mass. 2006); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2005); State v. Fischer, __ P.3d __, 2008 WL
2971520 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008).
107
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604–05 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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more searching review. A few judges, for example, have relied on
Lawrence to find constitutional defects with traditional laws
regulating polygamy and incest.108 More famously, the Supreme
Courts of California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts each cited
Lawrence in finding a right to same-sex marriage under the
constitutions of those states.109 Indeed, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court‘s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health seemed to find inspiration not only in Lawrence‘s bottomline but also in its tactic of strategic avoidance. There was no need
to decide whether gays and lesbians have a ―fundamental right‖ to
marry, the Massachusetts court insisted, because the state could not
justify its law even under rational-basis review. 110 While
Goodridge held that the state‘s policy of withholding marriage
108

See State v. John M., 894 A.2d 376 (Conn. Ct. App. 2006) (relying on
Lawrence to hold incest law unconstitutional), review granted, 899 A.2d 622
(Conn. 2006); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 776–78 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that Lawrence forbids criminalizing practice of
plural ―celestial‖ marriage as bigamy). But see, e.g., Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F.
Supp. 2d 1329 (D. Utah 2005) (upholding constitutionality of bar on polygamy
as applied to consenting adults), vacated on other grounds, 500 F.3d 1099 (10th
Cir. 2007); People v. Scott, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 592, 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(upholding incest law as applied to consenting adults); State v. Lowe, 861
N.E.2d 512 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (same); Holm, 137 P.3d at 741–49 (upholding
bigamy law against challenge after Lawrence). For critical examination of the
modern rationales for polygamy and incest laws after Lawrence, see Eugene
Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155
(2005) (polygamy); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory
Monogamy and Polyamorous Experience, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
277 (2004) (same); Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary
Family Law Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. L. REV. 1543 (2005)
(incest); Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN‘S L.J. 337
(2004) (same).
109
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008) (citing Lawrence‘s
understanding of the ―expansive and protective provisions of our constitutions‖
in construing the California constitution to protect same-sex marriage); Kerrigan
v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 467 (Conn. 2008) (concluding
that ―Lawrence represents a sea change in United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence concerning the rights of gay persons‖); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003).
110
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
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from same-sex couples was irrational, it was plain that the court‘s
form of rational-basis review had more than the usual bite. 111
Goodridge, like Lawrence, weaved together considerations of both
equal protection and substantive liberty to find that gays and
lesbians have a constitutional right to marry, while nominally
sidestepping the need to specify the exact metes and bounds of
―fundamental‖ privacy rights.112 Thus, although most courts have
not been eager to embrace Lawrence‘s broader implications, a
small but significant number have shown how the decision can be
used to rethink family law from the ground up.
III. GONZALES V. CARHART: THE ANTI-LAWRENCE?
In 2007, the Supreme Court handed down Gonzales v.
Carhart, 113 seeming to mark another turn in substantive due
process. Three years after Stenberg had struck Nebraska‘s law
against ―partial birth abortion,‖ Congress enacted the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act of 2003. Twice before, President Clinton had vetoed
similar measures.114 Now, with a new Administration in the White
111

Professor Lawrence Friedman has observed that Goodridge‘s
application of a more aggressive form of rational-basis review was consistent
with past decisions of the Massachusetts court applying the guarantees of the
state constitution. ―In fact,‖ Friedman writes, ―the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court has long applied at least two kinds of rational basis scrutiny to
government action: ordinary, deferential rational basis scrutiny in the mine run
of cases, and an enhanced rational basis scrutiny when the government action in
question implicates or restricts certain important personal interests.‖ Lawrence
Friedman, Ordinary and Enhanced Rational Basis Review in the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court: A Preliminary Investigation, 69 ALB. L. REV. 415, 416
(2006).
112
In emphasizing the propriety of blending together equality and liberty
concerns in scrutinizing traditional marriage laws, Goodridge drew directly
upon Lawrence. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 (asserting that ―[i]n matters
implicating marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children, the two
constitutional concepts frequently overlap, as they do here‖ (citing Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 575)).
113
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
114
GEORGE ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HEALTH LAW BOUNDARIES 123–26 (2005); Garrow, supra note 10, at 3–5
(reviewing legislative history of congressional enactments).
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House and with opponents of abortion rights energized by the fight
in Stenberg, Congress was ready to try again. 115 The Act so closely
paralleled the Nebraska law invalidated in Stenberg that it
amounted to an open declaration of defiance to the Court, or at
least an invitation to reconsider its decision. 116 In a signing
ceremony surrounded by nine congressional supporters of the
legislation (all middle-aged or elderly white men, as George Annas
points out117), President Bush exhibited the same fighting spirit.
Opponents of abortion would be undeterred by court rulings, he
made clear, and would ultimately prevail on ―the facts.‖ 118 ―The
facts about partial birth abortion are troubling and tragic,‖ Bush
declared to applause, ―and no lawyer‘s brief can make them seem
otherwise.‖119
The language of the new federal Act was somewhat more
specific than the Nebraska statute in describing the proscribed
procedure. Whereas the Nebraska law had prohibited physicians
from delivering ―a substantial portion‖ of a fetus into the vagina
before effecting fetal demise, the new federal law went farther in
specifying what sort of partial delivery would expose a doctor to
liability. The Act, like the Nebraska law, contained no exception
for a woman‘s health, though the legislative record made findings
that ―the prohibited procedure is never medically necessary.‖ 120 In
addition to the relatively modest drafting differences between the
115

See RICHARD A. GLENN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 112 (2003) (noting that ―[a]lthough Stenberg
appeared to be a victory for abortion-rights advocates, it certainly energized
antiabortion activists, who were encouraged by the closeness of the vote and the
public‘s perception of partial-birth abortion as a particularly gruesome
procedure‖).
116
See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1643 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that ―[t]he Act‘s sponsors left no doubt that their intention was to nullify our
ruling in Stenberg‖).
117
ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS, supra note 114, at 133.
118
Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (Nov. 5, 2003) (transcript of signing ceremony),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/200311051.html (last visited July 28, 2008).
119
Id.
120
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
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Nebraska and federal statutes, there was, of course, another
important intervening development: the membership of the
Supreme Court had changed. Since Stenberg, Chief Justice
Rehnquist had died and Justice O‘Connor had retired, replaced by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
In Gonzales v. Carhart, with the new make-up of the Court,
Justice Kennedy now wrote for a five-member majority in
upholding the federal Act. Not surprisingly, given the close
similarity between the federal statute and the earlier Nebraska law,
the litigation was largely a reprise of the constitutional challenge in
Stenberg, but now both issues that had proved fatal to the Nebraska
law were resolved in favor of the federal statute. Carhart did not
overrule Stenberg, but claimed to distinguish it on the facts. The
federal law avoided Stenberg‘s overbreadth concern by adding an
overt-act requirement and by specifying ―anatomical landmarks to
which the fetus must be partially delivered‖ to incur criminal
liability. 121 In sustaining the federal law‘s omission of a health
exception, Kennedy‘s majority opinion adopted the position he had
argued for in his Stenberg dissent. First, the need for a health
exception was analyzed through, not apart from, the undue-burden
test.122 Second, and relatedly, Kennedy made clear that the decisive
question was not—as it appeared to be for the majority in
Stenberg—whether the prohibited D&X procedure was, for some
women, the safest option.123 Instead, under Carhart, the decisive
question was whether any health risks imposed on women by the
Act were sufficiently ―significant‖ to outweigh the state‘s interests
in prohibiting the D&X method.124 Legislatures are entitled to
121

Id. at 1630.
See id. at 1635.
123
Compare, e.g., id. (emphasizing evidence that remaining methods offer
a ―safe‖ alternative to the proscribed method), with Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937
(emphasizing evidence that the proscribed method is, for some women, a ―safer‖
method).
124
See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1635–38. At oral argument, Priscilla Smith
and Eve Gartner, counsel for respondents challenging the constitutionality of the
federal Act, had each conceded that proof that D&X offered merely ―marginal‖
safety advantages for women would not be enough to invalidate the Act; but
they both insisted that D&X, in fact, offered some women significant safety
benefits. See Garrow, supra note 10, at 17–18 (reviewing colloquies at oral
122
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strike their own ―balance of risks,‖ Kennedy suggested, so long as
they leave available to women abortion options that are recognized
to be ―safe,‖ even if not necessarily the safest.125 ―[I]f some
procedures have different risks than others,‖ Kennedy wrote, ―it
does not follow that the State is altogether barred from imposing
reasonable regulations.‖126
In passing on the reasonableness of Congress‘ decision to
eliminate the D&X option, Carhart balanced the apparent
magnitude of the risks to women against the strength of the state‘s
regulatory interests. On both questions, Justice Kennedy‘s opinion
presented itself as heavily driven by the facts. In assessing the risks
to women, the Court deferred to congressional fact-finding
suggesting that forgoing the D&X option presented no significant
health risks. Kennedy hastened to add that the Court ―retain[ed] an
independent duty to review factual findings where constitutional
rights are at stake,‖ but insisted that ―a deferential standard‖ was
appropriate.127 True, some of Congress‘ findings were ―factually
incorrect,‖ but the record did not refute its ultimate judgment that
women would continue to have adequately ―safe‖ abortion options
even after the prohibition of D&X. 128 And, significantly, the Court
held that Congress was entitled to legislate based upon its own
rational judgments in the face of medical uncertainty about the
relevant risks.129
Similarly, in assessing the strengths of the state‘s interests in
prohibiting the D&X method, Carhart focused on what it
presented as the facts. In the majority opinion, Kennedy focused
first on the facts of the medical procedure itself, insisting that
simply describing ―the prohibited abortion procedure demonstrates
argument).
125
See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. The Carhart majority added that a
woman could still challenge the application of the Act to her on the ground that
it endangered her health, but insisted that ―[i]n an as-applied challenge the
nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial
attack.‖ Id. at 1638–39.
126
Id. at 1638.
127
Id. at 1637.
128
Id. at 1637–38.
129
See id. at 1638.
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the rationale for the congressional enactment.‖130 The Act,
Kennedy wrote, advanced several ―legitimate‖ state interests,
including expressing ―respect for the dignity of human life,‖
safeguarding public respect for the medical profession, addressing
―ethical and moral concerns‖ relating to the ―‗disturbing
similarity‘‖ between D&X abortions and infanticide, and
protecting women from future regret and distress over having
chosen the procedure.131 The factual record on these points was
generally thin, but the Court plainly found the underlying
assumptions to be reasonable. For example, the Court wrote that
―[w]hile we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptionable to conclude that some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained.‖132 It was ―self-evident‖ that a woman who later regrets
an abortion would have her grief compounded by knowing that she
had undergone the D&X procedure.133 It was ―reasonable for
Congress to think,‖ the Court wrote, that public respect for the
medical profession might be eroded more sharply by tolerance of
D&X than D&E abortions. 134
In assessing both the medical risks for women and the strength
of the state‘s interests, Carhart deferred to legislative factual
determinations that the Court considered reasonable, even when
record evidence to support those judgments was thin, unavailable,
or effectively in equipoise. The Court underscored the deferential
nature of its review by infusing its opinion with the language of
rational-basis review. ―[W]e must determine whether the Act
furthers the legitimate interest of the Government,‖ the opinion
stated at one point; ―[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it
does not impose an undue burden,‖ the opinion later stated, ―the
State may use its regulatory power . . . , all in furtherance of its
legitimate interests . . . .‖135
130

Id. at 1632.
Id. at 1633–34.
132
Id. at 1634 (citing an amicus curiae brief quoting the testimony of some
women who expressed regret over past abortions).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1635.
135
Id. at 1626, 1633; see also id. at 1638 (―Considerations of marginal
131
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Carhart seemed to pull back so hard from the Court‘s earlier
decisions in Stenberg and Lawrence that observers from diverse
perspectives were left to wonder whether the Roberts Court had
taken a dramatic turn not only on abortion rights but on substantive
due process more broadly. Indeed, in many respects, Carhart
seemed to depart so clearly from the approach suggested in
Lawrence that it might be seen as a sort of Anti-Lawrence:
• Lawrence had suggested the need for special sensitivity in
reviewing the use of criminal sanctions to control intimate
personal decisions.136 The Lawrence Court, for example,
had queried whether the state could enforce majoritarian
sensibilities about sexuality and family life ―through the
operation of the criminal law,‖ 137 and expressed special
concern with the stigma, disabilities, and ―collateral
consequences‖ associated with criminal sanctions. 138 In
Carhart, by contrast, the Court had no apparent qualms in
upholding a federal criminal statute that threatened to send
physicians to prison for up to two years. 139
• Lawrence had centered constitutional protection on vital
relational interests, pointedly tying individual decisions
about sex to the construction of family life and the
development of enduring ―personal bond[s].‖140 Carhart,
safety, including the balance of risks, are within the legislative competence
when the regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends.‖).
136
See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy,
Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 70–71 (2003)
(suggesting that Lawrence might be read to specially ―forbid[] the state from
using the heavy artillery of the criminal law‖).
137
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); see also id. at 567 (―The
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals.‖).
138
Id. at 575–76 (underscoring concern with ―the consequential nature of
the punishment and the state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the criminal
prohibition‖).
139
See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2007).
140
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; see Meyer, supra note 86, at 18; see also
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term – Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 97 (2003)
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by contrast, completed the shift of the locus for protection
of abortion from the doctor-patient relation (where it began
in Roe) to the individual privacy interest of the pregnant
woman alone, stripping away any vestiges of constitutional
protection for the doctor‘s independent professional
judgment and discretion. 141
• Lawrence had drawn powerfully on equality principles to
heighten its due process scrutiny of Texas‘ sodomy law,
recognizing that ―[e]quality of treatment and the due
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by
the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important
respects.‖142 Indeed, its entwining of ―substantive due
process and equal protection doctrine into a holistic
analysis of the cultural weight of the individual rights
involved‖ had struck many observers as Lawrence‘s most
salient feature, even if, as Kenneth Karst has shown, the
phenomenon was not unprecedented.143 By contrast,
Carhart pointedly ignored the equality implications of its
understanding of women‘s substantive liberties; indeed,
Kennedy‘s balancing of interests was focused, as Professor
Calabresi noted, on ―the state‘s interest in fetal life with no
further attention to—or discussion whatsoever of—a
woman‘s liberty interest in procuring abortion.‖ 144 Instead,
(noting that Lawrence‘s ―legal and rhetorical energy seems directed . . . at a
concern for the dignity of enduring intimate relationships and a refusal to permit
‗stigma‘ to be imposed because of those relationships‖).
141
For an insightful account of the role of the doctor-patient relationship in
Roe‘s protection of abortion, see Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion,
and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147 (2006); see also
Peter M. Ladwein, Note, Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v. Carhart: The
End of the Physician Veto and the Resulting Change in Abortion Jurisprudence¸
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847 (2008).
142
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
143
Hunter, Living with Lawrence, supra note 97, at 1103; see also Pamela
S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 (2002); Kenneth L. Karst, The
Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 99 (2007); Post, supra note 140, at 97.
144
Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1520.
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it was left to Justice Ginsburg in dissent to emphasize that
the case was not solely about ―some generalized notion of
privacy,‖ but also women‘s ―equal citizenship.‖145
• Lawrence had refused to accept traditional understandings
of family as a basis for laws against sodomy. Kennedy‘s
opinion in Lawrence had acknowledged that ―many
persons‖ favored sodomy laws as a means of advancing
―profound and deep convictions‖ relating to ―respect for the
traditional family.‖146 While expressing respect for these
convictions, Lawrence held that they could not justify
criminalization of contrary choices. 147 Carhart, by contrast,
relied directly on traditional assumptions about maternal
instinct as a basis for abortion regulation. ―Respect for
human life,‖ Kennedy wrote in Carhart, ―finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her
child.‖148 The state, Carhart held, was entitled to act to
protect women from the profound ―grief‖ and ―sorrow‖ that
would naturally be visited upon those who consented to
D&X abortions in defiance of that instinctive bond.149
Whereas Lawrence demanded public respect for the dignity
of those who defied conventional expectations concerning
145

Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (―[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do
not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a
woman‘s autonomy to determine her life‘s course, and thus to enjoy equal
citizenship stature.‖).
146
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
147
See id.
148
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634; see Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart:
Bringing Abortion Law Back into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409,
410–11 (2008) (observing that Carhart ―appeared to adopt presumptions about
parents and unborn children that family law typically applies to relationships
between parents and their born children,‖ and that ―Gonzales, like many family
law cases, apparently relied on these presumptions in deference to their claimed
self-evident nature and in response to the assertions of the involved adults‖).
149
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. For an account of the growing emphasis on
―woman-protective‖ rationales for restrictive abortion regulations, see Reva B.
Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of WomanProtective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007).
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gender roles and family organization, Carhart invoked
those very expectations to justify public control of defiant
choices.
• Finally, Lawrence held that government may not rest on
popular morality to cabin protected family or intimate
relationships, and instead must offer some demonstrable
social harm—some ―injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects.‖150 Carhart, by contrast, readily
upheld Congress‘ power to proscribe a method of abortion
based on popular ―ethical and moral concerns‖ likening the
D&X procedure to infanticide. 151 True, Carhart went on to
find additional social harms supporting the legislation—
erosion of public respect for the medical profession and
emotional distress suffered by regretful women—but these
were so thinly supported that it is hard to believe a likeminded Court could not have identified similar harms to
sustain Texas‘ sodomy law.152
IV. CHOOSING SIDES: LAWRENCE OR CARHART—OR BOTH?
The striking contrast between Lawrence and Carhart raises an
obvious and basic question: Does Carhart signal a general retreat
from Lawrence‘s expansive conception of personal liberty? Or,
alternatively, is Carhart‘s seemingly greater tolerance for state
intervention on personal autonomy limited to abortion? The
seeming schism between the decisions arguably appears to require
designating one of them an outlier. That both opinions were
written by the same author just four years apart makes the puzzle
all the more intriguing.
In a recent essay in the Michigan Law Review, Professor
Calabresi takes the former view. He reads Carhart as signaling
Justice Kennedy‘s return to the fold of substantive due process

150

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 571.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
152
See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1521 (―Clearly, the [Carhart] Court
takes a different view from the Casey and Lawrence Courts when it comes to
government enforcement of morals legislation.‖).
151
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skeptics after his brief and regrettable adventurism in Lawrence.153
Carhart is ―a pro-judicial restraint, anti-substantive due process
decision,‖ Calabresi writes, and ―suggests a greatly reduced role
for the Court in inventing new constitutional rights that is
dramatically opposed to the expansive language of Casey and
Lawrence.‖154 Kennedy‘s failure in Carhart to acknowledge
Lawrence, his slighting of women‘s liberty interests relating to
abortion, and his preference for as-applied over facial challenges,
Calabresi argues, each point to a retreat from Lawrence. 155 After
five years of uncertainty stirred by Lawrence‘s bold rhetorical
strokes, Carhart makes clear that Lawrence has not displaced
Glucksberg as the standard-bearer for modern substantive due
process analysis, and that Lawrence in fact can be safely relegated
to the wings, an outlier that has no application beyond its facts.156
―Kennedy‘s opinion in Gonzales seems not to regard courts as the
arbiters of our liberty,‖ Calabresi writes, ―but as the modest
adjudicators of very concrete cases and controversies in situations
where the Court absolutely must rule because the facts force it to
do so.‖157
Justice Ginsburg, by contrast, takes the second view suggested
above, seeing the decision in Carhart as driven chiefly by hostility
to abortion rights. In closing her dissent, Ginsburg contended that
the majority‘s decision ―cannot be understood as anything other
than an effort to chip away‖ at the right recognized in Roe and
Casey. 158 Other observers expressed a similar view, fearful—or
hopeful—that another shoe is yet to drop.159 Certainly, for those
153

See id. at 1520–21.
Id. at 1520.
155
See id. at 1520–21.
156
See id. at 1518–21, 1541.
157
Id. at 1521.
158
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1653 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
159
See 2007 NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., ROE V. WADE AND THE
RIGHT TO CHOOSE 3–4 (2007), available at http://www.naral.org/assets/files
/Courts-SCOTUS-Roe.pdf (stating that Carhart ―has paved the way for further
setbacks to reproductive freedom and personal privacy‖ and that ―Roe is in
peril‖); NAT‘L WOMEN‘S LAW CENTER, GONZALES V. CARHART: THE SUPREME
154
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who welcomed Lawrence‘s willingness to protect intimacy and
family liberty outside the lines of ―deeply rooted‖ social
convention, it might be tempting to take a page from Justice
Scalia‘s playbook in Lawrence and try to contain the damage by
casting Carhart as a rogue decision properly confined to its facts—
once again effectively cleaving substantive due process protection
for abortion from due process protection for other fundamental
family liberties. 160
I think it would be a mistake to suppose that Carhart does not
have broader implications for substantive due process and other
family privacy rights. But I do not agree that it amounts to an
implicit disavowal of Lawrence and a ratification of Glucksberg‘s
narrower, history-oriented conception of fundamental rights. In
fact, rather than seeing Justice Kennedy‘s opinions in Lawrence
and Carhart as essentially at odds, requiring a choice between
them, I see them as fundamentally sharing a common premise.
It seems implausible that Justice Kennedy intends Carhart to
usher in a reversal of Roe or his own handiwork in Casey. Indeed,
setting aside its provocative rhetoric, a close reading of Kennedy‘s
opinion confirms that it actually upheld the Act ―only in the
narrowest and most carefully circumscribed manner.‖161 Carhart
sustained the Act against facial constitutional attack, but left open
the possibility of future as-applied challenges in which ―the nature
of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced.‖ 162 What
Kennedy ultimately wants, then, is to have it both ways—to have
his right and eat it too, in effect—by way of a compromise in
COURT TURNS ITS BACK ON WOMEN‘S HEALTH AND ON THREE DECADES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5–6 (2007), available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf
/GonzalesvCarhart2.pdf. Cf. Carole Joffe, The Abortion Procedure Ban: Bush’s
Gift to His Base, DISSENT MAG., Fall 2007, available at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=941 (―Legal observers on all
sides of the abortion issue agree that [Carhart] may usher in a massive new
round of attempted restrictions on abortion.‖).
160
Cf. supra Part I (recounting bifurcation of family privacy doctrine
between abortion and other family-related liberties in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey and later implicit convergence of the doctrinal standards).
161
Garrow, supra note 10, at 47; accord Pushaw, supra note 5, at 526,
567–68.
162
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638–39.
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which the right is retained but subject to ―reasonable‖ state
limitation. Indeed, this was the emphatic central claim of both
Kennedy‘s majority opinion in Carhart and his earlier dissent in
Stenberg—that Casey‘s compromise requires a more even
weighing of state and private interests in evaluating the
permissibility of abortion regulations from case to case.163 ―Casey,
in short, struck a balance,‖ Kennedy underscored in Carhart. ―The
balance was central to its holding.‖164 As Kennedy saw it, Carhart
in no way ―refuse[d] to take Casey . . . seriously,‖ as Ginsburg
alleged in dissent.165 Instead, in his view, it was Stenberg that had
refused to take Casey seriously; Carhart merely restored the
balance.166
A similar sort of balancing was also central to Justice
Kennedy‘s approach to parental rights in Troxel. In Troxel,
Kennedy emphasized the importance of construing parents‘ childrearing rights flexibly in order to leave room for preserving
potentially significant family relationships between children and
non-parent caregivers. 167 He rejected the Washington Supreme
Court‘s construction of parents‘ rights, under which parents would
be constitutionally entitled to block visitation in all cases except
where doing so would inflict ―harm‖ on a child, as dangerously
―categorical‖; instead, he argued that the Constitution should be
read to leave courts with leeway to balance the competing interests
case-by-case through the flexible ―best interests of the child‖
standard.168 In a fundamental sense, Carhart can be seen as quite
consistent with Kennedy‘s instincts in Troxel and Lawrence; in
each case, Kennedy sought to avoid rigid, categorical
understandings of constitutional rights that might limit the ability
163

See id. at 1626–27; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956–57 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
164
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1627.
165
Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166
See Garrow, supra note 10, at 22–27, 45–47 (suggesting that Kennedy‘s
approach in Carhart appears to be consistent with his own understanding of
Casey).
167
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98–99 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
168
Id. at 96–99.
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of judges to decide from case to case how best to balance the
competing private and public interests.
Calabresi argues that Kennedy‘s position in Troxel supports
Calabresi‘s thesis that Kennedy is, at heart, a ―restraintist‖ when it
comes to substantive due process.169 Calabresi understands
Kennedy to have relied on Glucksberg‘s concern with ―history and
tradition‖ in rejecting a broad construction of parental rights, in
part out of a ―hesitat[ion] to constitutionalize this area of family
law.‖170 Yet, this misreads the nature of Kennedy‘s restraint in
Troxel. Kennedy readily accepted that unwanted visitation orders
burden parents‘ fundamental childrearing rights and trigger
constitutional scrutiny; in this sense, he was clearly no skeptic of
substantive due process protection for parents.171 Kennedy‘s point
was that parents‘ rights should not be construed ―categorical[ly],‖
in a manner that would reflexively override children‘s
countervailing interests in maintaining important relationships with
others. For Kennedy, the scope of parents‘ constitutional rights
respecting visitation should not be reduced to a bright-line rule;
instead, it should be ―elaborated with care‖ from case to case, with
sensitive regard for the particular circumstances of each family.172
This is a restrained approach to the scope of parental rights, in that
it pointedly rejects bright-line constitutional entitlements, but it is
not a restrained approach to substantive due process. Indeed, by
encouraging courts to define the boundaries of substantive due
process by balancing the competing relational interests from case
to case, Kennedy‘s approach seems highly likely to propel the
further ―constitutionalization‖ of family law. 173
Lawrence can be read in much the same way. After all, for all
its eloquence, the constitutional protection it gives is emphatically
qualified. The Court bars criminal penalties on private, consensual,
adult intimacy, but is careful to set aside whether the intimate
bonds of gays and lesbians are entitled to formal recognition. The
169

See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1522, 1528–31.
Id. at 1529–30.
171
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172
See id. at 101.
173
See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM.
L.Q. __ (forthcoming 2008).
170
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Court suggests that altogether different constitutional standards
would apply to ―public conduct‖ or to intimacy involving
minors.174 Justice O‘Connor, focusing on equal protection in her
opinion concurring in the judgment, suggested a similar line. She
agreed that mere ―[m]oral disapproval of a group‖ is not a
legitimate reason for state discrimination, and so invalidated
Texas‘ sodomy law, but she was keen to emphasize that this did
not mean that ―other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals would similarly fail.‖ 175 Specifically, she argued
that ―other [legitimate] reasons‖ support limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples.176
Justice Scalia castigated both Kennedy and O‘Connor for
presuming a power to distinguish between morality-based sodomy
laws and morality-based marriage laws. There is no way in
―principle and logic,‖ Scalia wrote, to defend the distinctions
Lawrence supposes.177 ―One of the benefits of leaving regulation
of this matter to the people rather than to the courts,‖ he observed,
―is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their
logical conclusion. The people may feel that their disapprobation
of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual
marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual
acts—and may legislate accordingly.‖ 178 While ―[t]he Court today
pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of action,‖ he
concluded, such judgments are quintessentially political and cannot
be explained as a matter of constitutional principle.179 The
Supreme Courts of California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts
evidently agree, having cited Lawrence in finding state
constitutional protection for same-sex marriage.
174

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). For a contrary view
concerning ―public conduct,‖ see Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public
Sex (unpublished draft paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091526.
175
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583, 585 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
176
Id. at 585.
177
Id.at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178
Id. at 604.
179
Id.
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Yet I suspect that Justice Kennedy may find in Carhart a
model for taking up the challenge. Carhart, like Lawrence and
Troxel, reached an outcome that aligns closely with popular
sensibilities. As Professor Robert Pushaw observes, ―[w]hatever
the deficiencies of Justice Kennedy‘s legal analysis, his political
instincts seem sound . . . . [H]e has roughly articulated the
mainstream American view: allow women to choose abortion in
the early period of pregnancy, but recognize the government‘s
interest in expressing its citizens‘ moral condemnation of partialbirth abortion.‖180 Kennedy‘s majority opinion justified this result
not by manipulating the definitional boundaries of the
constitutional right, but by accepting ―facts‖ demonstrating the
reasonableness of Congress‘ incursion on the right.
Carhart upheld the federal Act based on a battery of factual
claims. The public interests advanced by the law included—
alongside moral objections to the method of abortion—concern for
protecting public respect for the medical profession and protecting
women from distress and regret over their choices. The absence of
a health exception was explained away on the basis of Congress‘
findings minimizing (indeed, denying) any health advantages of
the banned method. The problem, of course, was that each of these
empirical assumptions was unproven at best. Conjecture about the
loss of public respect for doctors was deemed ―reasonable.‖ The
absence of any ―reliable data‖ proving the incidence of postabortion regret and distress was of no consequence, because the
harm to women was ―self-evident.‖ Congress was entitled to
assume that its action did not expose women to significant health
risks because the matter was ―uncertain.‖ The Court claimed to
exercise an ―independent constitutional duty‖ to review legislative
findings trenching on constitutional rights, but this seemed to
amount only to ensuring that the factual claims were within the
realm of reasonable disagreement. So long as the evidence did not
squarely preclude the legislature‘s assumption, it was free to
regulate.
This tolerance of regulation on the basis of uncertain factual
conjecture provides a route to justifying the line-drawing on family
180

Pushaw, supra note 5, at 569–70 (emphasis in original).
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liberties hinted at in Lawrence. Factual claims concerning the
welfare of children raised by gay and lesbian couples have already
taken center stage in defenses of state laws banning same-sex
marriage.181 Ever since Hawaii was forced to justify its ban on
same-sex marriage in Baehr v. Lewin 182 more than a decade ago,
states have downplayed moral objections to homosexuality and
focused on empirical claims that traditional, dual-sex marriage
provides the optimal setting for procreation and the raising of
children.183 A number of judges hearing these cases have viewed
―the state of the scientific evidence as unsettled on the critical
question,‖184 and have concluded, as the New York Court of
Appeals did in 2006, that ―[i]n the absence of conclusive scientific
evidence, the Legislature [can] rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in
the home.‖185
Of course, if the rational basis test properly governs, such
deference is unobjectionable. Yet Carhart, with its deference to
legislative factfinding in the context of medical uncertainty, might
seem to validate this approach even if a form of intermediate
scrutiny were thought to apply. If so, a path is cleared for states to
place ―reasonable‖ limitations on family liberties under
Lawrence—for instance, decriminalizing adult intimacy while
denying public recognition in marriage—all on the basis of factual
claims that, while unproven, strike the court as reasonable.
This points out an inherent danger of the approach taken in
Lawrence (and Goodridge), broadening constitutional protection
181

See Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on
Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORD. L. REV. 2733, 2735
(2008).
182
852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993).
183
See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996) (examining state‘s justifications for banning same-sex marriage on
remand from Hawaii Supreme Court); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. App.
Div. 2005), rev’d in part, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963, 1006 (Wash. 2006); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in
Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153 (2004).
184
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
185
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006).
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without squarely defining the nature of the private interest at stake
as ―fundamental‖ and without specifying the nature and strength of
the constitutional scrutiny it triggers. Under traditional doctrine,
deference to plausible legislative conjecture was the heart of
rational-basis review; under heightened scrutiny, government was
generally required to prove its claims of necessity. The murkiness
of the ―new‖ substantive due process provides cover for expanding
protection, but also for importing uncharacteristically deferential
standards like the one adopted in Carhart.
CONCLUSION
Professor Pushaw has argued that ―[t]he abortion cases
illuminate the perils of the modern Court‘s idiosyncratic,
politicized, common law style of constitutional decision
making.‖186 Ironically, this is an assessment with which observers
from different perspectives may well agree. For Pushaw and other
skeptics of the constitutional abortion right, the see-sawing in the
partial-birth abortion cases highlights the need to extract the Court
from the business of supervising legislative judgment in the field
altogether. For many supporters of abortion rights, the see-sawing
demonstrates the perilous fragility of constitutional protection
under the softer ―undue burden‖ framework and the need to
contain judicial discretion by more heavily privileging the liberty
interest of pregnant women. What both camps desire is a
jurisprudence in which the boundaries of permissible state
regulation of abortion are drawn with brighter lines at the outset,
and in which outcomes are less dependent upon the vicissitudes of
ad hoc balancing (and thus the ideological inclinations of the
particular Justices sitting at the time of argument).
But approaches that make the initial characterization of
constitutional rights outcome-determinative have their costs as
well. In the broader context of family privacy rights, I have
defended the Court‘s de facto use of a form of intermediate
constitutional scrutiny on pragmatic grounds. 187 Rigid application
186
187

Pushaw, supra note 5, at 591.
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of conventional fundamental-rights analysis is often poorly suited
to capture the complex interplay of individual interests at stake in
controversies over the family. The use of full-bodied strict scrutiny
to protect family privacy rights assumes a unity of family interests
opposing the state‘s intervention, when in fact family members
may be divided over their associational ambitions. Too often, the
felt need to squeeze complicated family conflicts into standard
doctrinal categories has led courts to deny any heightened
constitutional protection for non-standard rights-holders, such as
children, informal caregivers, or same-sex partners.188 Against this
background, the loosening up of traditional constitutional analysis
in Troxel and Lawrence has for the most part struck me as a
welcome development. By substituting a less heavy-handed form
of scrutiny, the Court has been able to recognize and more
sensitively accommodate a broader range of family interests in our
increasingly diverse society.
Carhart is a reminder that the indeterminacy of this approach
can leave some privacy interests vulnerable to state regulation.
Lawrence was not a one-sided victory for a broader liberty of
family life; the flip side of that generosity was the danger that
newly recognized family rights might be more easily overcome by
claims of state necessity. The new danger underscored by Carhart
is that states might not actually be put to persuasive proof of their
claims, but might be allowed to rest on plausible conjecture in the
absence of conclusive counterproof. If so, Lawrence and Carhart
may be chiefly significant for shifting the fight over substantive
due process to a new ground, one increasingly centered on the
―reasonableness‖ of the state‘s factual assumptions.
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